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The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, in Rust v. Sullivan. that regulations 
promulgated by the Reagan and Bush Administrations requiring Title X funds 
recipients not to counselor make referrals for abortions, were constitutional. 
Critics of the rules, led by Planned Parenthood (whose financial stake in 
overturning the regulations is substantial), branded the provisions as "gag rules," 
violating "medical ethics." The regulations, they claimed, impinged on the 
physician-patient relationship, depriving women of "all the medical information" 
to which a woman is entitled and, hence, unethical. The purpose of this essay is to 
examine the charge of violation of "medical ethics" by the Title X rules. 
The Hippocratic Oath reads in part: 
I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked nor suggest any such counsel, and in 
like manner I will not give to any woman a pessary to produce abortion} 
The Oath bars a physician from inducing death. Notably, it not only forbids 
causing death but it also bars counselling such a course. The life orientation of the 
Oath is clear: the physician is not to prostitute his art by dealing death. The 
Hippocratic physician is literally a sworn enemy of death. He may not bring 
about his patient's death nor may he advocate death as a form of treatment. 
The Oath immediately links this prohibition about administering "deadly 
medicine" or counselling such as a course with abortion: "in like manner I will 
not give any woman a pessary to produce abortion" (emphasis added). The 
Hippocratic physician is one who regards abortion as a prostitution of the 
doctor's art. 
Thus, the Oath which formed the cornerstone of Western medical practice, the 
symbolic touchstone of medical ethics, supplies three points relevant to Rust: (i) it 
explicitly bans abortion; (ii) it clearly forbids doctors to cause death; and (iii) it 
expressly prohibits counselling death. The position of the Hippocratic Oath, of 
course, collides with the conclusions of the Supreme Court in Roe et aL v. Wade, 
which is why Justice Blackmun goes out of his way in the opinion to insist that 
the Hippocratic tradition was one of many different approaches to medical 
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ethics in its day: for Blackmun, the pluralism of medical traditions allows him to 
circumvent the clear requirements of the Oath. A bevy of ethics, of course, does 
not answer the ethical question of which one is right, but Blackmun apparently 
banked on the dominance of ethical relativism in contemporary American 
culture to respond to that ethical question with an agnostic stare. In case anybody 
still had some lingering nostalgia for the Hippocratic tradition, however, 
Blackmun tries to tar it with guilt by association: Christianity played a part in its 
spread and prevalence. Certainly any ethical system which came to prevail with 
some assistance from the Church, especially when such prevalence wiped out 
contradictory ethical systems (like the "progressive" Roman potestas patriae) 
must in some sense be importing religion impermissibly into the public forum. 
From here it is but a short step to reading Congressman Henry Hyde's mail in 
search of religious comments which might "prove" that the Hyde amendment's 
ban on Medicaid abortions is really just an imposition of religious doctrine in the 
secular realm. 
Hippocratic Tradition to the Periphery 
The marginalization of the Hippocratic tradition, especially in the past two 
decades, is directly correlated with the fact that doctors who are faithful to that 
tradition are not abortionists and do not build "death machines." Nor is it 
coincidental that, as the Hippocratic tradition has been progressively relegated to 
the periphery, a plethora of books, journals, conferences, seminars, etc. on 
"medical ethics" and "bioethics" has inundated medicine and the academy. 
What is appealing about so many of the contemporary approaches is that, after 
the obligatory handwringing and anguishing, an "ethicist" will eventually come 
along who will "sign off' on just about anything one wants to do. 
Is this author being unjustifiably uncritical in this last comment? No, because 
so much of contemporary "bioethics" is form without substance. Underlying 
many such approaches is a Kantian preoccupation with procedure. Once one 
follows through on the procedure one has done the ethical. This is one of the 
problems behind the struggle over Rust. The anomaly is that those who claim that 
the Title X rules are unethical are precisely the same people who consciously 
refuse to let the debate about whether abortion itself is ethical enter the picture. 
They want to confine the argument to procedures about recommending/ referring 
for abortions, but avoid at all costs morally evaluating what is being 
recommended or referred for. 
Some bioethicists may propose additional criteria to the procedural but their 
tests, usually variations on some sort of utilitarianism, 'emotivism, or 
consequentialism, have built-in proclivities to dovetail with the subjective 
conclusions preferred by the procedural partners. Given the intellectual 
skepticism about whether there are objective goods/values, and whether these 
goods/values are objectively knowable, one is led back to the same ethical 
relativism Blackmun relies upon in dismissing the Hippocratic tradition: 
confronted with a plurality of contradictory ethical approaches, canonizing one 
of them is impermissible. Of course this does not answer the question "what is 
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right?" It evades it. But evading the central question of abortion has characterized 
the opponents of Rust from the beginning. 
The Hippocratic Oath becomes an embarrassment for some precisely because 
its ethics are not only formal but substantive: it not only requires the physician to 
act "for the benefit of my patients" but also specifies a priori what is beneficial 
and what is baleful for those patients. Many physicians, even the Planned 
Parenthood plaintiffs in Rust, could subscribe to the Hippocratic stipulation that 
"I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and 
judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is 
deleterious and mischevous." Where the problem arises is when a medico-ethical 
tradition puts flesh on those bones, indicating, e.g., that abortion or death 
counselling is "deleterious and mischevious." 
One other element of the Hippocratic tradition which causes it to run afoul of 
some contemporaries is its focus on the physician as ethical agent. The physician 
determines what is beneficial and what is detrimental in treatment. The physician 
is not to cause or recommend death. The physician is not to induce abortion. 
Critics of the Hippocratic tradition brand it paternalistic: doctor knows best. 
They claim that the patient is passive, not a partner in medical decisions. 
Now certainly any competent physician knows that the intelligent cooperation 
of one's patient is an important element in health care. Medicine, law, and ethics 
all recognize the critically important role of informed consent. The day when 
patients submissively adhered to doctor's instructions without questioning, if it 
ever existed, is past and rightly so. Nevertheless, a partnership between patient 
and physician does not mean that the latter should forego his professional ethics 
to meet the desires of the former. For Hippocrates, medicine is an art, not a 
consumer service. It demands professional judgment, including professional 
ethics, and not just servicing of patient's wishes. One has only to compare this 
perspective with the contemporary situation. Modem gynecology has, to a great 
degree, degenerated into wish fulfillment quite apart from any real notion of 
"healthy and normal" vs. "abnormal and pathological."2 The idea of 
"institutional conscience," the right of hospitals, nursing homes, and other health 
care facilities to set ethical standards in their patient care, is under strong attack, 
especially as regards performing abortions or removing feeding tubes.3 The 
assault is particularly strong on public institutions. The 1991 Maryland abortion 
act, for example, leaves real question about the degrees of institutional and 
personal conscience left in that state. Some "feminist" critics of Roe et aL v. 
Wade, for example, fault the decision for seeming to connect the right to privacy 
more with the physician-woman relationship than with a woman's absolute 
"right" to choose abortion, with a physician merely to carry her choice into effect. 
It is this absoluteness of choice that fuels the campaign for importing RU-486 into 
the United States and, though the drug's regimen requires medical supervision, 
one can imagine some sectors ofthe "women's" movement that may press for the 
drug's availability "on demand." 
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Medical Ethics 
The entire discussion up to this point should indicate one thing: one cannot say 
without qualification that Rust v. Sullivan violates "medical ethics." In fact, it 
comports with one of the most central medico-ethical traditions of the West. (We 
have not even discussed its clear conformity with the Catholic medico-ethical 
tradition, a clearly significant one since it was the Church that gave birth to 
hospitals and which has been involved in health care throughout much of its 
history). What Rust violates is one particular school of medical ethics, a very 
modem one, one which lacks any definitive norms of practical and particular 
right and wrong, one which puts its accent on procedure and on meeting 
customer preference. It is a tradition far removed from the formative influence of 
the Hippocratic Oath. 
What is paradoxical about this new medical ethic is, however, its implicit 
desire to be normative. Critics of Hippocrates seek to dismiss his tradition by 
arguing that it was one ethic among many. Critics of Catholic medical ethics 
-including some self-styled theologians - argue in favor of gutting specific 
prescriptions and proscriptions, e.g., of the "Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Facilities," in the name of "pluralism."· Modem moral 
relativism claims that there is no one, objective, normative good and, even if there 
is, we cannot know it. Amid all these claims about diversity and pluralism and 
relativity, however, opponents of Rust claim that "medical ethics" are violated by 
the Title X "gag rule." Such claims leave the impression that no system of medical 
ethics is reconciliable with Rust, something shown here to be untrue. Hippocrates 
"gagged" his physicians in the name of ethics over two millenia ago. Such claims 
also suggest that the "medical ethics" invoked by Rust's opponents are 
normative, universal, and controlling, claims in utter contradiction to the very 
principles upon which this new ethic lies. Everything is relative - except my 
claim that everything is relative. 
A final thought: opponents of Rust maintain that they are only demanding that 
the flow of information between doctor and patient not be impeded. "Women 
should get all the facts." The sincerity of such people would be more credible if 
m?IJY of the same parties fighting the Title X rules were not the same ones who 
oonvinced the Supreme Court, in its 1986 Thornburg decision, to strike down a 
Pennsylvania law requiring that women be given the biological and medical facts 
about fetal development and what happens in an abortion before one is 
performed. Pennsylvania argued that women deserved all the facts about 
abortion; the abortionists said that would be "distressful propaganda." That came 
from the same people who would like Congress to enact their one view of 
medical ethics into law and thereby allow the real propagandists to continue their 
lucrative enterprise with the taxpayer's dollar. 
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